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Abstract: This paper develops a theory that interprets the philosophical schools 
of American Pragmatism and Continental Postmodernism as important, 
complementary resources for understanding the effects of structure and agency on 
the possibilities for learning and meaning-making.   This type of theory building 
can provide for practitioners and scholars a useful framework for negotiating the 
limited battle between self-determination and structural determination.   
 
Introduction 
In the context of planning theory, Cervero and Wilson have clarified the problems 
the dichotomy of structure and agency creates for Adult Education theory (1994).  They 
say, “Traditional planning theories, with their emphasis on either self-determination or 
structural determination, have failed to clarify what Giddens refers to as the ‘essential 
recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices;’” by which they mean the 
way that structure and agency are interdependent and mutually constituted.  In addressing 
the recursiveness of social life, their discussion of planning theory is directly relevant to 
the more general concerns of my paper.  They continue, 
 
 “Therefore, planning is not solely scientific, as the classical viewpoint purports.  Nor is it 
simply a matter of situating the planner within a context, as the naturalistic and practical 
traditions suggest. Nor does the critical viewpoint provide a complete understanding, 
with its emphasis on the confluence of structural forces. What is required is a theory of 
human action that integrates agency and structure.”  
 
The formulation of planning practice elucidated by Cervero and Wilson suggests 
a need for adult education theory to reach beyond its traditional conceptual terrain to 
provide resources for an integrative theory of human action and structural forces. This 
paper proposes that the anti-foundationalist and non-dualistic lens provided by the 
philosophical traditions of American Pragmatism and Continental Postmodernism can 
help provide such resources. 
I understand the theoretical contribution of this paper to follow the tradition of 
Paulo Freire’s notion of “naming the world” (1970), a notion that through its emphasis on 
dialogical conscientization makes a profound gesture toward integrating structure and 
agency.  By building on Freire, these two philosophical traditions can help fill a 
theoretical void in the Adult Education field – the same theoretical void that Cervero and 
Wilson discuss. 
Adult education is, in part, about developing human agency. The lens through 
which agency has been understood has for too long been oversimplified, under-theorized, 
and inaccurate; characterized as either a decontextualized, ahistorical, autonomous 
subject, or as a predetermined, automaton controlled by structural forces.  Contemporary 
philosophical literature can contribute to a more nuanced lens by circumventing the 
structure and agency dichotomy: American Pragmatism as seen in William James’ radical 
empiricism (1977), John Dewey’s individualism and democratic faith (1984), and George 
Herbert Mead’s social behaviorism (1934); and Continental Postmodernism as seen in 
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction (1979), and Foucault’s genealogy (1988) provide the 
conceptual tools for adult educators to build on Freire, Giroux, Horkheimer, and Adorno 
by further illuminating a rich human agent who is embodied, contextualized, and 
historicized.  These philosophers and the philosophical traditions emanating from them 
constitute a profound challenge to the subject-centered, Cartesian, modern philosophy 
that is at the heart of adult education’s traditional notions of human agency.   
If we take our task as educators and researchers to be equipping learners for 
engaged citizenship and deep democracy, we must be clear about the problem to be 
addressed.  Our first step – and one of our most important steps as well – is the analysis 
of human suffering at the hands of enlightenment rationality put forth by Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. According to their 
argument, we are unwittingly complicit in the demise of democratic public spheres, the 
resistance to the democratic production of knowledge, and the evaporation of broad 
human agency.  Walker Percy – novelist and philosopher -- argues that this degradation is 
the result of alienation.  His argument in support of Horkheimer and Adorno leads him to 
characterize humanity's self-understanding as twofold:  1) Humans can be understood as 
organisms in an environment, a sociological unit, an uncultured creature, a psychological 
dynamism endowed genetically like other organisms with needs and drives, who through 
evolution has developed strategies for learning and surviving by means of certain 
adaptive transactions with the environment; and, 2) Humans are also understood to be 
somehow endowed with certain other unique properties which he does not share with 
other organisms-with certain inalienable rights, reason, freedom, and an intrinsic dignity-
and as a consequence the highest value to which a democratic society can be committed 
is the respect of the sacredness and worth of the individual (Percy 20). 
Per this description, and to connect Percy with Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
dialectic of enlightenment, critical pedagogy, and, consequently, the dialectic of human 
agency and social structure, humanity's self-understanding is both universal and 
particular (as Horkheimer and Adorno would understand those terms) and, indeed, it is 
this apparently incoherent proposition that constitutes the roots of humanity's alienation.  
A person is an individual, distinct and unique, yet that same person is understandable, 
biologically and scientifically, only to the extent that he or she is the same as everyone 
else.  Science, medicine, biology, and technology – for example -- cannot speak to the 
individual, if they are to live up to the standards of enlightenment rationality.  As the pure 
research of scientism took command of the modern mind, the individual was silenced; the 
individual --the particular-- is absorbed in a world that is fabricated and, consequently, is 
made impotent by an artificial integration with the universal.  This kind of identity 
thinking turns concrete human individuals into abstractions, constituting a subtle yet 
powerful kind of violence that numbs and desensitizes our most humane capacities.   
As the laws of the marketplace take precedence over the laws of the 
state as guardians of the public good, politics is increasingly removed from 
power.  The state offers little help in mediating the interface between the 
advance of capital and its rapacious commercial interests, on the one hand, 
and those non-commodified interests and nonmarket spheres that create the 
political, economic, and social conditions vital for critical citizenship and 
democratic public life on the other.  Within the prevailing discourse of 
neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no 
vocabulary for political or social transformation, no collective vision, no 
social agency to challenge the privatization and commercialization of 
schooling. . . .  In the midst of this concerted attack on the public, the market 
driven consumer juggernaut continues to mobilize desires in the interest of 
producing market identities and market relationships that ultimately appear 
as, Theodor Adorno once put it, nothing less than ‘a prohibition on thinking 
itself’” (Giroux 2001, xxii). 
 
Giroux describes with appropriate urgency the overwhelming evidence that our 
collective sense of agency is greatly impoverished by our current social structure.  The 
ideology of technical and enlightenment rationality becomes oppressive as our options 
for human agency in the early 21st Century become limited to consumerism as opposed to 
creating meaning through non-commercial values such as empathy, compassion, love, 
and solidarity. 
Learning is a non-dialectical process 
While providing a powerful critique of the contradictions of enlightenment 
rationality and an accurate analysis of its negative effects on human agency, critical 
theory and dialectical, immanent critique is limited in its effectiveness for creating an 
epistemological structure that can empower agency and meaning-making.  John Stuhr 
argues that, while the endeavor toward and spirit of identity thinking is damaging to 
human relations and agency, the doom predicted by Adorno as the result of identity 
thinking is less pronounced because the nature of the human encounter with the world is 
actually non-dialectical (Stuhr 2003).  Percy’s alienation, the net result, is ultimately the 
same, but the ways we understand the possibilities for melioristic work and positive 
change, i.e. agency, are very different.  The best of what we know about how humans 
learn, and, thus, make meaning and become effective agents tells us that subject and 
object, immanence and transcendence are not actually part of our lived experience, but 
are, instead, conceptual fabrications that we impose on our experience after the fact. John 
Dewey refers to this tendency as “the philosophical fallacy”.  In truth, our learning is 
much more contextual than even a dialectical structure allows; meaning that the opposites 
of subject and object, immanence and transcendence are always already part of each other 
within a given situation-act, i.e. subject and object do not constitute non-identity (the 
essential ingredient for a dialectical relationship), but, instead, constitute different senses 
of a unified conceptualized situation-act.  In this way – and in the tradition of Piagetian 
genetic psychology, Deweyan/Jamesian radical empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s non-
dualistic materialism, and Nietzschean/Foucauldian Genealogy – knowing is part and 
parcel of acting. Moving to a non-dialectical structure of thought – a postmodern and 
pragmatic, i.e. post-metaphysical, anti-foundational, and anti-representational structure 
of thought – opens doors for emancipation and agency that were not previously there.   
 
We Understand the World by Changing It 
The common thread of knowing being part and parcel of acting fundamentally 
shifts the way we should understand structure and agency: agency framed this way, as 
part of knowing, is no longer simply in a reciprocal relationship with structure, but is now 
in a mutually-constitutive, reciprocal relationship.  We find ourselves in a place where 
knowing is no longer about certainty – as it has been since Greek thought surmounted 
Hebrew philosophy/theology – but is, instead, a kind of action/agency; knowing is both a 
product and producer of action.  As Chris Hoadley says about Design-Based Research, 
“Design-Based Research boils down to trying to understand the world by trying to 
change it” (2005).  
Knowing framed this way is postmodern and pragmatic: it becomes a kind of 
contextualism that is post-metaphysical, anti-foundational, anti-representational and 
enables a kind of meaning-making and meaningful perception that saturates language and 
tools while, at the same time, that same meaning-making and meaningful perception 
seeps through and constitutes perception.  Being post-metaphysical – deeply imbedded in 
context, anti-foundational – deeply sensitive to historical and sociological shifts, and anti-
representational – deeply constructed by human interaction, agency and meaning-making 
are much more creative than they are alienated.  Moving towards a notion of learning that 
is transformative and focused on meaning-making, we can recognize that the modern 
epistemology informing notions of agency does little to help us understand this process.  
Modern epistemology is split between the empiricist and the rationalist camps, but the 
only real difference between them, as is also true of the difference between behaviorists 
and cognitivists, is whether the world or the mind makes the larger contribution to 
knowledge. The fruits of the interface of pragmatism and postmodernism, and the best of 
contemporary research into how we learn, tell us that the actual nature of our experience 
is anything but dualistic.  Our learning is more like a gestalt than memorizing a 
vocabulary list.  Additionally, it becomes clearer that rationality and meaning develop 
within a situation rather than in the dialectical movement between the separate parts of 
this dualism.  The upshot of this anti-metaphysical, anti-foundational epistemology is that 
“action” gets us very close to the “emancipation” of critical pedagogy and the 
“reconstruction of experience” in American Pragmatism.  
What does it mean for rationality and meaning to develop within a situation?: 
because we are living, breathing creatures, we cannot be understood as existing in a 
distinct way apart from our environment.  For John Dewey, human nature is part and 
parcel of nature in the broader sense, i.e. we live through our environment.  As he says in 
Experience and Nature (1958):  “[A] living organism and its life processes involve a 
world or nature temporally and spatially external to itself but internal to its functions” 
(212).  We cannot function, we cannot be who or what we are, without these things that 
are external to us participating in our lives in an internal way.  We cannot, for example, 
chew without food or become human without other people.  Experience, then, is simply 
what happens when we function.  The catch is that our functioning cannot be understood 
unless we recognize the initial unity of transaction between human nature and the rest of 
nature.  It is only upon reflection, upon analysis and abstraction, that we can 
discriminate between organism and environment.  This initial non-dialectical unity is the 
foundation of activity theory and human meaning-making. 
With this non-dualistic understanding of experience and situations, Dewey has 
bound the self up with the possibilities within objects and situations.  Quite literally, 
meaning is created only by the transaction of one with the other.  They cannot be 
understood apart from each other and it is only by virtue of the initial transaction that we 
can subsequently discriminate between organism and environment. Within the 
transaction, within the binding up of self with situation, of human nature with nature, 
experience is primarily a qualitative event, not reducible to easily digestible and easily 
calculated bits of sense-data.  It is characterized by a certain quality which is felt before it 
is engaged cognitively.  Emotions and intuition direct our attention and thus control the 
participating elements of an experience.  Our rational tools engage the situation only after 
we have intuited the quality of that situation and only after our emotions have directed us 
to what is most interesting in that situation. (Dewey, 1960).  In other words, the 
qualitative nature of experience, the intuitive and emotional element of experience, 
controls the learning situation – what is learned and how we learn it – to a greater extent 
than any rational process or internal cognitive structure or stimuli in the external 
environment.  Moving us beyond the contradiction at the heart of the alienation and 
enlightenment rationality, Dewey does profound justice to the irreducibly human 
characteristic of learning. Even more profound than this, though, is how the pervasive 
moral element bleeds into the entire process.  Learning can never be value neutral 
because it is socially constructed.  Our natural laws and our truths – the very things that 
we seek to learn – are the products of the learning process.  There is, for example, no 
gravity that is not already somebody’s gravity. Within experience, within the transaction, 
cognitive meanings emerge when reflection goes to work on precognitive activities and 
feelings.  We learn when we can reconstruct experience to make a backward and forward 
connection between what was done, putting one’s finger in a flame for example, and what 
was suffered as a consequence of that doing, the pain suffered after the burn.  This 
reconstruction of experience is shot through with social and political influences, and we 
can reconstruct experience in a way that facilitates growth or we can reconstruct 
experience in a way that leaves our actions uncoordinated.  
 In separate papers written for the Society for the Advancement of American 
Philosophy, John Stuhr and Charles Hobbs frame knowledge in a way that circumvents 
the traditional structure and agency dualism by building on emergent themes in 
pragmatism and postmodernism.  When we move beyond the spectator theory of 
knowledge to a more contextual understanding of knowing that is more about the mutual 
constitution of knowledge within the situation-act (mutually constituted within the act of 
perception, by the perceiver and the perceived), agency is liberated from the need to 
transcend the immanence of the “dialectic of enlightenment” and instead becomes 
something like William James’ “will to believe”/”Nietzsche’s will to power” in which we 
quite literally create the world in which we know-act by the way we conceptualize the 
situation-act. What we have is agency constituted through the speech-act, not by the 
speech-act. In other words, the important thing is not the simple fact that the speech-act 
happened, but that as the speech-act happens, we are changing-knowing the world.  
Again, this is a kind of contextualism that is post-metaphysical, anti-foundational, anti-
representational and enables a kind of meaning-making and meaningful perception that 
saturates language and tools while, at the same time, meaning-making and meaningful 
perception seep through and constitute perception.   
Akin to Freire’s “naming the world” and “conscientization,” this holistic 
understanding of learning is not a new perspective.  Peter Sawchuck makes this 
point while arguing for a different understanding of technology training for 
workers: in his research,  
“[w]e see that the apparent problem of a technological underclass is less a reflection of 
the availability of equipment or people’s cognitive abilities than a matter of their access 
to stable cultural communities that recognize and build upon the social standpoints of 
their members, which in turn provides a voice, opportunities and, power for these 
communities” (2003). 
 
Based on his research, Sawchuck sees training problems within a community of 
workers as a lack of meaning-making mechanisms rather than as a problem of 
tools, intelligence, or capacity.  The problem is not one of structure, nor one of 
agency; instead, the problem is one of misguided activity. Building on the non-
dialectical social theory above, this theoretical foundation is a kind of social 
constructivism, some of the best of which is currently being researched as 
“activity theory,” but takes as its source and inspiration the philosophies of John 
Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault.  
We are not spectators; we are participants who must care for the future because 
we are formed, created, and constructed by that future, and therefore we should act so as 
to secure the best possible consequences.  In every experience, every transaction, we are 
bound up with our environment, and can, thus, shape the outcome of that experience even 
as we are shaped by that very same experience.  In denying the dualistic assumptions of 
the cognitivists and the behaviorists, the fruits of the pragmatists and postmodernists 
point us toward an understanding of learning that makes us accountable for the quality of 
the world in which we live.  Keeping in mind the important analysis offered by the 
Frankfurt School and supported by Percy’s notion of the human alienation, the theory of 
human action evident in the intersection of pragmatism and postmodernism, and clarified 
more in activity theory, presents a useful integration of agency and structure; an 
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